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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the performance of regularized channel
inversion precoding in MISO broadcast channels with confi-
dential messages under imperfect channel state information
at the transmitter (CSIT). We obtain an approximation for
the achievable secrecy sum-rate which is almost surely exact
as the number of transmit antennas and the number of users
grow to infinity in a fixed ratio. Simulations prove this anayl-
sis accurate even for finite-size systems. For FDD systems,
we determine how the CSIT error must scale with the SNR,
and we derive the number of feedback bits required to ensure
a constant high-SNR rate gap to the case with perfect CSIT.
For TDD systems, we study the optimum amount of channel
training that maximizes the high-SNR secrecy sum-rate.
Index Terms— Physical layer security, limited feedback,
broadcast channel, random matrix theory, linear precoding.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multiuser communication is very susceptible to
eavesdropping, and securing the transmitted information is
critical. Although security has traditionally been ensured
at the network layer by cryptographic schemes, this raises
issues like key distribution and management, and high com-
putational complexity. Moreover, these schemes rely on the
unproven assumption that certain mathematical functions are
hard to invert [1]. Therefore, tackling security for multiuser
systems at the physical layer is of critical importance.
Physical layer security exploits the randomness inherent
in noisy channels [2, 3]. The secrecy capacity region of a
broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC), where
the intended users can act maliciously as eavesdroppers, was
studied in [4–6], but only for the case of two users. For a
larger BCC with any number of malicious users, it was shown
in [7–9] that regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding
can achieve large secrecy sum-rates with low-complexity im-
plementation, if the channel state information at the transmit-
ter (CSIT) is perfect. However in real systems, CSIT must be
acquired through channel feedback or estimation. This pro-
cess can be challenging for practical time-varying scenarios,
and the obtained information is inevitably imperfect.
In this paper, we study the secrecy sum-rates achievable
by RCI precoding in the multiple-input single-output (MISO)
BCC under imperfect CSIT. This work directly extends some
of the analysis in [10, 11] by requiring the transmitted mes-
sages to be kept confidential. Furthermore, this work general-
izes the results in [9], where perfect CSIT was assumed. Our
main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We obtain a closed-form expression for the large-
system secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding
under imperfect CSIT. Simulations prove the analysis
accurate even when applied to finite-size systems.
• We study frequency division duplex (FDD) systems,
and determine how the CSIT error must scale with the
SNR, to maintain a given rate gap to the case with per-
fect CSIT. Under random vector quantization (RVQ),
we find the minimum number of bits that each user
must employ for channel quantization and feedback.
• We study time division duplex (TDD) systems, and de-
rive an expression for the secrecy sum-rate as a function
of the amount of channel training. We obtain approx-
imated expressions for the amount of channel training
that maximizes the high-SNR secrecy sum-rate.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO BCC, where a base station (BS) with M
antennas simultaneously transmits K independent confiden-
tial messages u = [u1, . . . , uK ]T , with E[|uk|2] = 1, to K
spatially dispersed single-antenna users, over a block fading
channel. The transmitted signal is x = [x1, . . . , xM ]T . User
k receives
yk =
M∑
j=1
hk,jxj + nk (1)
where hk,j ∼ CN (0, 1) is the i.i.d. channel between the
j-th transmit antenna element and the k-th user, and nk ∼
CN (0, σ2) is the noise seen at the k-th receiver. The cor-
responding vector equation is y = Hx + n, where H =
[h1, . . . ,hK ] is the K × M channel matrix. We define the
downlink SNR as ρ = 1/σ2 and impose E[‖x‖2] = 1.
Only an imperfect estimate Hˆ of the true channel H is
available at the transmitter, which is modeled as
H = Hˆ+E (2)
where the error E is independent from Hˆ. The entries of Hˆ
and E are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and variances 1− τ2 and τ2, respectively. The value of
τ ∈ [0, 1] depends on the quality and technique used for chan-
nel estimation. When τ = 0 the CSIT is perfectly known,
whereas when τ = 1 no CSIT is available at all.
It is required that the BS securely transmits each confiden-
tial message uk, ensuring that the unintended users receive no
information. In general, the behavior of the users cannot be
determined by the BS. As a worst-case scenario, in our sys-
tem we assume that for each intended receiver k the remain-
ing K − 1 users can cooperate to jointly eavesdrop on the
message uk. For each user k, the alliance of the K − 1 coop-
erating eavesdroppers is equivalent to a single eavesdropper
with K − 1 receive antennas, which is denoted by k˜.
In this paper, we consider RCI precoding for the MISO
BCC [12, 13]. RCI precoding is a linear scheme of particular
interest because of its low-complexity [14, 15], and because
it controls the amount of interference and information leak-
age to the unintended receivers [7–9]. In RCI precoding, the
transmitted vector x is obtained as x = Wˆu, where [12, 13]
Wˆ = [wˆ1, . . . , wˆK ] =
1√
γ
(
HˆHHˆ+MξI
)−1
HˆH (3)
is the precoding matrix, γ = tr{Hˆ(HˆHHˆ+MξI)−2HˆH} is
the power normalization constant, and ξ is the regularization
parameter that maximizes the large-system secrecy sum-rate
under perfect CSIT, given in (4) [9].
3. LARGE-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
We now study the secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder in
the large-system regime, where both the number of receivers
K and the number of transmit antennas M approach infinity,
with their ratio β = K/M being held constant.
A secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the
MISO BCC under perfect CSIT was obtained in [8], based
on the work in [16]. Following a similar approach, a se-
crecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the presence
of channel estimation error with variance τ2 is
Rs=
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1+SINRk
)
−log2
(
1+SINR
k˜
)]+
, (5)
where [·]+ △= max(·, 0), and where SINRk and SINRk˜ are
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios for the message
uk at the intended receiver k and the eavesdropper k˜, respec-
tively, given by
SINRk=
ρ
∣∣hHk wˆk∣∣2
1+ρ
∑
j 6=k
∣∣hHk wˆj∣∣2 , SINRk˜=ρ ‖Hkwˆk‖
2 (6)
and Hk is the matrix obtained from H by removing the k-th
row. We now give a deterministic equivalent for Rs.
Theorem 1. Let ρ > 0, β > 0, and let Rs be the secrecy sum-
rate in the presence of channel estimation error with variance
τ2, defined in (5). Define ρ˜ △= ρ(1−τ
2)
ρτ2+1 and ξ˜
△
= ξ1−τ2 . Then
1
M
(Rs −R◦s) M→∞−→ 0 almost surely, where R◦s is the large-
system secrecy sum-rate under CSIT error, given by
R◦s = K

log2
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
ρ˜+ ξ˜ρ˜
β [1+g(β,ξ˜)]
2
ρ˜+[1+g(β,ξ˜)]2
1 + ρ
[
τ2 + 1−τ
2
(1+g(β,ξ˜))2
]


+
(7)
with g (β, ξ)= 12
[
sgn(ξ)
√
(1−β)2
ξ2
+ 2(1+β)
ξ
+1+ 1−β
ξ
−1
]
.
Proof. From [10], a deterministic equivalent for SINRk is
SINR◦k = g(β, ξ˜)
ρ˜+ ξ˜ρ˜
β
[
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
]2
ρ˜+
[
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
]2 . (8)
Similarly, a deterministic equivalent for SINRk˜ is given by
SINR◦
k˜
= ρ

τ2 + 1− τ2(
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
)2

 . (9)
Theorem 1 then follows from (5), (8), (9), and from the con-
tinuous mapping theorem [17].
When τ = 0, the value of R◦s in (7) reduces to the large-
system secrecy sum-rate under perfect CSIT, given by [9]
R¯◦s = K

log2 1 + g (β, ξ)
ρ+ ρξ
β
[1+g(β,ξ)]2
ρ+[1+g(β,ξ)]2
1 + ρ
(1+g(β,ξ))2


+
. (10)
Fig. 1 compares the secrecy sum-rate R◦s of the RCI pre-
coder from the large-system analysis to the simulated ergodic
secrecy sum-rate Rs for finite M , under CSIT error τ = 0.1,
and for different values of β. The values of R◦s and Rs were
obtained by (7) and (5), respectively. As expected, the accu-
racy of the deterministic equivalent increases as M grows.
4. CHANNEL FEEDBACK IN FDD SYSTEMS
In this section we consider the case of FDD systems, where
users quantize their perfectly estimated channel vectors and
send the quantization index back to the transmitter over a
limited-rate channel. We assume that the channel magnitude
is perfectly known to the transmitter, since it can be efficiently
quantized, and that each channel direction is quantized using
ξ =
−2ρ2 (1− β)2 + 6ρβ + 2β2 − 2 [β (ρ+ 1)− ρ] ·√β2 [ρ2 + ρ+ 1]− β [2ρ (ρ− 1)] + ρ2
6ρ2 (β + 2) + 6ρβ
(4)
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Fig. 1. Comparison between R◦s/M from (7) and the simu-
lated ergodic secrecy sum-rate Rs/M .
B bits and random vector quantization (RVQ) [18]. In RVQ,
each user independently generates a random codebook with
2B vectors, isotropically distributed on the M -dimensional
unit sphere. RVQ generates a CSIT that follows the model in
(2), where the error τ2 can be upper bounded as [18]
τ2 < 2−
B
M−1 . (11)
In the following, we derive the necessary scaling of the
channel estimation error τ2 to ensure a high-SNR constant
rate gap of log2 b bits to the case with perfect CSIT. A con-
stant gap ensures that the multiplexing gain is not affected by
the imperfect CSIT. We define the per-user rate gap ∆ as
∆
△
=
R¯◦s −R◦s
K
(12)
where R¯◦s and R◦s are the large-system secrecy sum-rates
achieved by the RCI precoder under perfect CSIT and under
CSIT distortion τ2, respectively.
It can be shown from (10) that for β > 1 the high-SNR
secrecy sum-rate is zero irrespective of the distortion τ , and
this is also confirmed by the simulations in Fig. 1. This hap-
pens because in the worst-case scenario, the alliance of coop-
erating eavesdroppers can cancel the interference. Therefore
when the number of users K exceeds the number of antennas
M , SINRk is interference limited, whereas SINRk˜ is not, and
Rs tends to zero for all τ . Since for β > 1 both R¯◦s and R◦s
tend to zero in the high-SNR regime, in the remainder of the
paper we will consider the case β ≤ 1 as the most interesting.
For this case, we obtain the following result.
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy rate R¯s/K under perfect CSIT vs
Rs/K under τ2 from Theorem 2, with log2 b = 1 bit.
Theorem 2. In the large-system regime, for β ≤ 1 and b > 1,
a CSIT distortion τ2 = C
ρ
, with
C =
{
1
2
(√
4b− 3− 1) if β < 1
2
3
(√
3b− 2− 1) if β = 1 (13)
produces a high-SNR rate gap of log2 b bits.
Proof. Let µ△=τ2ρ+ τ4ρ(1+g(β,ξ))21−τ2 + τ
2(1+g(β,ξ))2
1−τ2 . Then
lim
ρ→∞
∆=


lim
ρ→∞
log2
[
1+ β
2µ
4ρ(1−β)2
]
=log2 b if β < 1
lim
ρ→∞
log2
[
1+ µ4
]
= log2 b if β = 1
(14)
Corollary 1. In order to maintain a high-SNR secrecy rate
offset of log2 b bits per user in the large-system regime, it is
sufficient to scale the number of feedback bits B per user as
B≈
{
M−1
3 ρdB−(M−1) [log2
(√
4b− 3−1)−1] if β < 1
M−1
3 ρdB−(M−1) [log2
√
3b−2−1
3 +1] if β = 1(15)
Proof. The result follows from (11) and Theorem 2.
Fig. 2 shows the ergodic per-user secrecy rate Rs/K ,
achieved by the RCI precoder for M = 10 in the presence of
a channel estimation error that scales as in Theorem 2, with
log2 b = 1 bit. This is compared to the ergodic rate R¯s/K ,
achieved by the same precoder under perfect CSIT (τ = 0).
The simulations show that the desired secrecy rate gap of 1
bit is approximately maintained at high SNR, thus confirming
the claims made in Theorem 2. Fig. 2 also proves the analysis
accurate even when applied to finite-size systems.
5. CHANNEL TRAINING IN TDD SYSTEMS
We now consider a TDD system where uplink and downlink
transmissions alternate on the same channel. The channel es-
timation at the transmitter is obtained from known pilot sym-
bols sent by the users. Let T be the channel coherence in-
terval, i.e. the number of channel uses for which the channel
is constant. The interval T is divided into Tt uses for uplink
training and T−Tt uses for the downlink transmission of data.
The channel state information at the users is provided by a
training phase in the downlink. However, a minimal amount
of training is sufficient for this phase, and we can therefore
neglect the overhead due to the downlink training [19].
Each user transmits the same number Tt > K of orthog-
onal pilot symbols to the base station, which estimates all the
K channels simultaneously. The channel estimation error at
the base station depends on the number Tt as well as on the
SNR ρul on the uplink channel, and it is given by [20]
τ2 =
1
1 + Ttρul
. (16)
Hence we can write the secrecy sum-rate as a function of Tt
Rˆ◦s=
T − Tt
T
K

log2
1+g(β, ξ˜)
ρ˜+ ξ˜ρ˜
β [1+g(β,ξ˜)]
2
ρ˜+[1+g(β,ξ˜)]2
1+ρ
[
τ2 + 1−τ
2
(1+g(β,ξ˜))2
]


+
(17)
where in the case of TDD systems we have
ξ˜ =
ξ(1 + Ttρul)
Ttρul
and ρ˜ = ρTtρul
ρ+ 1 + Ttρul
. (18)
We now study the optimal value of the training interval Tt for
high SNR, in the case when the uplink and downlink SNR ρul
and ρ both grow with a finite ratio c △= ρ/ρul.
Theorem 3. In the large-system regime, let ρ, ρul be large
with c = ρ/ρul constant. Then, an approximation of the se-
crecy sum-rate maximizing amount of channel training Tt can
be obtained as a solution of the equations
T 3t q + T
2
t (cq −Kc)
+ Tt(c
2q +KcT − 2Kc2) + 2Kc2T = 0, (19)
T 3t 4q + T
2
t (4cq − 4Kc)
+ Tt(3c
2q + 4KcT − 6Kc2) + 6KTc2 = 0, (20)
for β < 1 and β = 1, respectively, and with q △= −R¯◦s log 2.
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Fig. 3. Optimal relative amount of training Tt/T vs high-
SNR approximation, for M = K = 10 and c = ρ/ρul = 10.
Proof. Rewrite Rˆ◦s = T−TtT
(
R¯◦s −K∆
)
, where
lim
ρ,ρul→∞
∆ =


log2
(
1 + c
2
T 2t
+ c
Tt
)
for β < 1
log2
(
1 + 3c
2
4T 2t
+ c
Tt
)
for β = 1
.
(21)
Then (19) and (20) can be obtained by setting ∂Rˆ◦s/∂Tt = 0
and after further high-SNR approximations.
Fig. 3 shows the simulated optimal relative amount of
training Tt/T versus the downlink SNR ρ, for a system with
M = K = 10, and c = 10. This is compared to the high-
SNR approximations obtained from Theorem 3. Three sets of
curves are shown, each for a different coherence time T . The
figure shows that for increasing SNR, the channel estimation
becomes more accurate, and less resources should be allo-
cated to channel training. At high SNR, the optimal amount
of training converges to the value predicted by the analysis
and provided in Theorem 3.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered regularized channel inversion
precoding for the MISO broadcast channel with confidential
messages, under imperfect channel state information at the
transmitter. For this system set-up, we first studied the pre-
coder in the large-system regime, and obtained a deterministic
equivalent for the achievable secrecy sum-rate. This analysis
proved to be accurate even for finite-size systems. We then
determined the amount of feedback required to the users in
an FDD system to ensure a constant high-SNR rate gap to the
case with perfect channel state information, so that the mul-
tiplexing gain is not affected. We further considered the case
of TDD systems and studied the optimum amount of channel
training that maximizes the high-SNR secrecy sum-rate.
7. REFERENCES
[1] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and
A. L. Swindlehurst, “Principles of physical-layer se-
curity in multiuser wireless networks: Survey,” 2010,
arXiv:1011.3754.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Tech.
J., vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[3] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with con-
fidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24,
no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[4] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic, and R. D. Yates, “Dis-
crete memoryless interference and broadcast channels
with confidential messages: Secrecy rate regions,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2493–2507, 2008.
[5] R. Liu and H. V. Poor, “Secrecy capacity region of a
multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with con-
fidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 55,
no. 3, pp. 1235–1249, 2009.
[6] R. Liu, T. Liu, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Multiple-
input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channels with
confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
56, no. 9, pp. 4215–4227, 2010.
[7] G. Geraci, J. Yuan, A. Razi, and I. B. Collings, “Se-
crecy sum-rates for multi-user MIMO linear precoding,”
in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on Wireless Commun. Systems
(ISWCS), Nov. 2011.
[8] G. Geraci, M. Egan, J. Yuan, A. Razi, and I. B.
Collings, “Secrecy sum-rates for multi-user MIMO
regularized channel inversion precoding,” IEEE
Trans. Commun., 2012, to appear. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5063.
[9] G. Geraci, J. Yuan, and I. B. Collings, “Large system
analysis of the secrecy sum-rates with regularized chan-
nel inversion precoding,” in Proc. IEEE Wireless Com-
mun. Networking Conference (WCNC), Apr. 2012.
[10] V. K. Nguyen, R. Muharar, and J. S. Evans,
“Multiuser transmit beamforming via regular-
ized channel inversion: A large system analy-
sis,” Technical Report, Nov. 2009, Available:
http://cubinlab.ee.unimelb.edu.au/ rmuharar/doc/
manuscriptrevRusdha22- 11.pdf.
[11] S. Wagner, R. Couillet, M. Debbah, and D. T. M. Slock,
“Large system analysis of linear precoding in corre-
lated MISO broadcast channels under limited feedback,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 7, pp. 4509–4537,
July 2012.
[12] C. B. Peel, B. M. Hochwald, and A. L. Swindlehurst,
“A vector-perturbation technique for near-capacity mul-
tiantenna multiuser communication - Part I: Channel in-
version and regularization,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol.
53, no. 1, pp. 195–202, Jan. 2005.
[13] M. Joham, W. Utschick, and J. A. Nossek, “Lin-
ear transmit processing in MIMO communications sys-
tems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 53, no. 8, pp.
2700–2712, Aug. 2005.
[14] Q. H. Spencer, C. B. Peel, A. L. Swindlehurst, and
M. Haardt, “An introduction to the multi-user MIMO
downlink,” IEEE Comms. Mag., vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 60–
67, Oct. 2004.
[15] Q. Li, G. Li, W. Lee, M. Lee, D. Mazzarese, B. Clerckx,
and Z. Li, “MIMO techniques in WiMAX and LTE: a
feature overview,” IEEE Comms. Mag., vol. 48, no. 5,
pp. 86–92, May 2010.
[16] A. Khisti and G.W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with
multiple antennas I: The MISOME wiretap channel,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 3088–3104,
July 2010.
[17] P. Billingsley, Probability and measure, 3rd ed., Hobo-
ken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.
[18] N. Jindal, “MIMO broadcast channels with finite-rate
feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, no. 11, pp.
5045–5060, Nov. 2006.
[19] T. L. Marzetta, N. Jindal, and A. Lozano, “What is
the value of joint processing of pilots and data in block-
fading channels?,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on Inform.
Theory (ISIT), 2009, pp. 2189–2193.
[20] G. Caire, N. Jindal, M. Kobayashi, and N. Ravindran,
“Multiuser MIMO achievable rates with downlink train-
ing and channel state feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 2845–2866, 2010.
